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TOWARDS A THEORY OF CYBERPLACE:
A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK
 By: RONNIE COHEN* AND JANINE S. HILLER** 
ABSTRACT 
This article discusses whether the existing legal framework for property and places 
should apply to the electronic medium, or whether the uniqueness of the Internet requires a 
different characterization.  The source of the right of the owner of an Internet site to legally 
control access to and use of the site and its content is the tort law of trespass and the law of 
contract.  The sources of the right of users to freely access and use Internet content are the 
policies of free speech and public accommodation. Part I of this paper reviews the common 
law trespass theories that courts have employed to regulate online activities.  Part II considers 
the definition of “place”1 and whether particular uses of the Internet are “places of public 
accommodation.”2  Part III proposes a new legal framework that could serve as a basis for 
legislative action to promote both of these policies in cyberspace.  This framework recognizes 
the unique qualities of the Internet, incorporating both the public policy favoring freedom 
of expression and the private property interest in controlling unauthorized use of Internet 
resources.    
I. INTRODUCTION
{1}  Does the Internet contain a public commons in which speech and civil rights should be 
protected?  Conversely, do networks consist of private property that the individual owner can 
control?  When faced with these questions of Internet control, courts may stretch traditional 
legal concepts, statutory interpretations, and the application of legal precedent to issues 
involving similar, but ultimately different, questions of rights and obligations.  Conflict arises 
over whether the existing legal framework for property and places should apply to the electronic 
medium, or whether the uniqueness of the Internet requires a different characterization.  On 
the one hand, the Supreme Court characterized the Internet as the “most participatory form of 
mass speech yet developed,”3 while on the other hand, private networks are staking out their 
claims to cyber territory and suing those who interfere with their property rights.4  The tension 
between two conceptual frameworks, voice and place, is evident in the early development 
of Internet case law. As courts grapple with new cases, many have analogized cyberspace to 
physical places.5 The analogy is important, as it is well documented that the words we choose 
to describe a concept can influence the way in which the concept is understood.6 The use 
of a connected set of metaphors creates a cognitive model that unconsciously shapes our 
perception of the subject.7  Metaphors give us insight to our present and future experiences, 
thereby contributing to the creation of our social realities.8  The language we often use to 
describe the Internet is descriptive of physical places.  For example, the Internet is frequently 
referred to as the “Information Superhighway.”9  Searching for information is often referred to 
as “surfing.”10 The NetLingo dictionary offers many other terms as examples of the language of 
place, including address, architecture, chat room, crawler, data traffic, domain name, firewall, 
gateway, local area and wide area networks, navigate, netizen, and portal.11  We use these 
terms to describe both the concept of the Internet and the activities we associate with it.  The 
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terms also play a part in setting the legal landscape of Internet law.12  If we analogize various 
aspects of the Internet, such as networks and web sites, to physical places, which are generally 
governed by property law, then we will likely determine the relationships of people who occupy, 
visit, or intrude upon those places by reference to traditional property law.13
 {2}The consistent application of a framework of either private or public property, place or 
possession, to the use of computer networks will resound in many ways that may not be within 
the current contemplation of the courts.14  Is there an alternative conceptualization of the Internet, 
one that overcomes the limitations of metaphor?  Should this concept include the Internet as 
a voice, as well as a place?  Is the law of speech and public forum an important element of the 
framework?15
{3}The right of the owner of an Internet site to legally control access to and use of the site and its 
content is based on the tort law of trespass and the law of contract.  The right of users to freely 
access and use Internet content is based on policies of free speech and public accommodation.  
Part I of this paper reviews the common law trespass theories that litigants have argued, and 
courts have employed, to regulate online activities.  Part II considers the definition of “place” and 
whether particular uses of the Internet are “places of public accommodation.”  Part III proposes 
a new legal framework that could serve as a basis for legislative action to promote both of 
these policies in cyberspace.  This framework recognizes the unique qualities of the Internet, 
incorporating both the public policy favoring freedom of expression and the private property 
interest in controlling unauthorized use of Internet resources.   
II. TRESPASS 
{4}  Both trespass to personal property and trespass to real property are relevant to the discussion 
of Internet property.  The Restatement of Torts is a leading treatise in the development of civil 
law.  It is influential in state law development and serves as persuasive authority for judicial 
decisions.16  Section 217 of the Second Restatement of Torts defines a trespass to chattels, or 
personal property, as the following: “A trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally (a) 
dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession 
of another.”17  Section 218 states additional requirements for damages to the property in order for 
a person to be liable for the trespass:
One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to the possessor 
of the chattel if, but only if, (a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or (b) 
the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or (c) the possessor is 
deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or (d) bodily harm is caused 
to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor 
has a legally protected interest.18
{5}  The comments to Section 218 explain that damages for trespass to chattels do not arise 
automatically, as with real property, but instead require that an important interest of the 
possessor of the chattel be affected.19 In addition, the comments explain that:
[O]ne who intentionally intermeddles with another’s chattel is subject to liability only if his 
intermeddling is harmful to the possessor’s materially valuable interest in the physical 
condition, quality, or value of the chattel, or if the possessor is deprived of the use of the 
chattel for a substantial time, or some other legally protected interest of the possessor is 
affected.20
Thus, there are two basic requirements to prove trespass to chattels.  First, the chattel must be 
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interfered with, or meddled with, and second, the chattel must suffer some damage.
{6}  Illustration 2 of the Restatement is important in the context of trespass to chattels in the 
Internet environment.  It explains; “A, a child, climbs upon the back of B’s large dog and pulls its 
ears.  No harm is done to the dog or to any other legally protected interest of B.  A is not liable to 
B.”21 As the example highlights, proof of damages should be an important element in a case of 
trespass to chattels in the Internet environment. 
{7}  In comparison to the tort of trespass to chattels, which requires proof of damages, the tort 
of trespass to land requires only that there be a proof of a physical incursion onto the property 
of another.22  It is the protection of the landowner’s right to exclude all others, which is reflected 
in the tort of trespass to land.23 Thus, no actual damages need be proven in order to prove 
liability for trespass; nominal damages will be awarded.24 To a great extent this is a result of the 
historical background of real property law, from English common law, that real property rights are 
inviolate.25
{8}  The right to exclude others is also seen as a part of a real property owner’s “bundle of 
property rights.”26 Although historically real property rights have been seen as sacrosanct, the 
Supreme Court has noted that “[n]either property rights nor contract rights are absolute . . . 
.  Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common 
interest . . . .”27  As Internet sites define their terms of use, and create contracts to delineate 
authorized access, Internet site administrators may exclude potential users and limit use of the 
website.28  The state, however, may be within its rights to regulate the privately imposed terms of 
use to protect the public interest in an open Internet.  In modern law, the nature of the property 
affects real property rights.  That is, if private property is used as a public place, civil rights laws 
as well as the laws of common carriers place limitations on the owner’s right to exclude others.29 
{9}  The state may also act to protect public speech on private property.  While some state 
constitutions provide protection for free speech on certain types of private property,30 most do 
not,31 and no equivalent federal protection exists.32 Moreover, while it is possible that the state’s 
enforcement of trespass laws might constitute the state action necessary to bring a speech claim 
in these cases, no such state action is present where a private entity engages in discriminatory 
enforcement of private terms of use.33
{10}  The controlling case recognizing the right of a state to protect speech on private property 
is Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins.34  In Pruneyard, the United States Supreme Court held 
that California’s constitutional guarantee of the right to speech and petition was enforceable 
against the owner of a private shopping center, and that it did not amount to a taking of property 
to require the property owner to allow the speech on its private property.35 Although the United 
States Constitution does not guarantee such a right, a state may do so, as long as it does not so 
interfere with the use of the property that it amounts to a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment.36
{11}  The most recent case to apply the Pruneyard rationale to state action is Albertson’s Inc. 
v. Young,37 where the California Court discussed whether the right to free speech was protected 
on the sidewalk of a grocery store.  The court stated that “[t]he test that courts must apply is 
whether, considering the nature and circumstances of the private property, it has become the 
functional equivalent of a traditional public forum.”38  The court then carefully examined the 
physical location of the store, the layout, its size, parking lots, and relation of the speech to the 
business.39  Because the store was a one-story building, not connected to other contiguous stores, 
with relatively site-specific parking, and no areas designed for public congregation, it was not a 
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public forum.40  In addition, the speech did not relate to criticism of the business itself, therefore 
not implicating free speech under that more specific scenario.41
A.  Electronic Robots and Trespass to Chattels
{12}  Several trespass to chattel cases address the issue of Internet access to another’s computer 
through its website.  One of the first cases to consider the application of the trespass to chattels 
tort to the Internet was TicketMaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.42  A computer program, known 
as a web crawler, searched the Ticketmaster web site and transferred that information to the 
Tickets.com format on the Tickets.com web site.43 The court found that while the trespass to 
chattels claim could apply to such a circumstance, because the information was publicly available 
and there was no proof of irreparable injury, the action failed.44  To date this is the only case that 
has denied an injunction for trespass to chattels when an electronic agent has obtained web site 
information. 
{13}  Most courts have found that even minimal harm can support a trespass to chattels claim 
and have more broadly applied this common law tort to the new medium.45 In eBay v. Bidder’s 
Edge,46 Register.com v. Verio,47 and Oyster Software v. Forms Processing,48 the courts addressed 
whether the use of an electronic robot to search a plaintiff’s website constitutes a trespass.  In 
Intel v. Hamidi,49 the court considered whether the sending of an e-mail through a proprietary 
company e-mail network constitutes trespass to chattels.  In all of these cases, the court 
examines the intangible attributes of the electronic environment in order to apply the age-old 
tort of trespass to chattels, where the computer system was the personal property subject to the 
trespass. These three recent trespass cases involving commercial robots searching the computers 
of another are important background to the Hamidi case that involves expressive action, but 
which, nonetheless, is pursued under the rubric of an invasion of a common law right in property. 
{14}  An electronic robot is a program that will scour web sites automatically for particular 
information.50  Robots can also be known as “scrapers,” as they scrape information off of web 
sites, or as “spyders,” as they spin a web to catch information.51  In each of the three cases, 
eBay v. Bidder’s Edge, Register.com v. Verio, and Oyster Software v. Forms Processing, the 
defendant used an electronic robot to secure some type of information from the plaintiff’s web 
site.  Bidder’s Edge and Verio obtained significant amounts of information from the plaintiff’s site 
in this manner.  Bidder’s Edge robots scanned the prices listed on eBay approximately 100,000 
times a day.52  Verio accessed the WHOIS database of Register.com daily to obtain registered 
domain names and to match them with contact information.53 Although these websites are 
open to the public, and no information obtained by the robots is in any way confidential, in each 
case the terms of use prohibits the use of electronic access by robots.  Thus, in both cases the 
unauthorized access by these robots to automatically collect publicly available information, 
coupled with the use of the plaintiffs’ system capacity, resulted in the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction by the courts based on trespass to chattels.  The unauthorized access, viewed in light 
of the terms of use, satisfied the meddling component of trespass, and the reduced network 
capacity satisfied the damage component.54
{15}  Oyster Software involved a different level of interference with chattels.  An automated 
program extracted information contained in the web page metatags, which are simple codes that 
list identifying words that are like an index to finding the web site.55  Without discussion, the court 
made note that the access to the computer to copy the metatags was without authorization.56 
The court found that significant damages are not required to prove trespass to chattels when a 
computer is the property involved; all that is needed is use of another’s computer.57 Therefore, the 
mere copying of the plaintiff’s metatags by Oyster’s electronic robot was a sufficient allegation to 
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defeat the motion to dismiss the trespass to chattels claim.58  It has been suggested that when 
courts allow minimal damages to suffice, as was the situation in the Oyster case, they confuse 
the analysis of trespass to chattels with trespass to real property.59
B. Unwanted Messages and Trespass to Chattels
{16}  Unsolicited bulk e-mail, also known as spam, is a problem for system administrators and 
individuals because it uses server space and interferes with normal communications.  Early cases 
established a fairly consistent view that spam could be actionable as a trespass to chattels.  The 
first case was CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.60  Because of customer complaints, 
CompuServe notified Cyber Promotions to cease sending e-mails to its subscribers; however, 
Cyber Promotions refused to do so.  The court applied the law of trespass to chattels as found 
in the Restatement and identified the harm to CompuServe’s computer service caused by the 
large amount of unsolicited e-mail as the core of the tort.61  Following the Compuserve case, 
several cases brought by America Online (AOL) confirmed the application of the tort of trespass 
to chattels as a basis for injunctions to prevent spam and awarded damages to the plaintiff.  
According to the court in these cases, the sending of bulk e-mail, the spam, violated the site’s 
stated terms of use.  The number of e-mails sent was significant to the computer network in these 
cases:  in AOL v. IMS,62 60 million e-mails were sent, in AOL v. LCGM, Inc.,63 over 90 million e-mail 
messages sent, and in AOL v. Greatdeals.net,64 over 130 million e-mails were sent.  In all of these 
cases, AOL was successful in arguing that the spam constituted a trespass to its system, and that 
it had been harmed by the effect on the system of the large amounts of unsolicited e-mail.  
{17}  In contrast to commercial messages, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi65 involved the use of a company’s 
e-mail system without the system’s permission in order to convey messages criticizing the 
company.  The decision addressed the clash between speech and property rights.  Hamidi was the 
webmaster for a forum devoted to airing grievances about the work environment and conditions 
at Intel Corporation.  The forum was not hosted on Intel’s network.  In addition, he sent several e-
mails to all of Intel’s employees and took steps to defeat Intel’s security that blocked messages 
from certain outside sources.  Hamidi argued that this electronic forum was essential for 
communication between employees of Intel’s international corporation, who otherwise would be 
unable to effectively communicate across the globe.66
{18}  Intel, however, did not appreciate Hamidi’s e-mails to its employees, and Intel claimed a 
trespass to its chattel.  The action was based on the argument that Hamidi committed a trespass 
to the internal e-mail system of Intel, because he sent six e-mails to thousands of electronic 
work addresses of Intel employees.  Intel claimed the e-mails clogged its system and wasted 
company human capital, because the company had to use additional resources to stop Hamidi’s 
messages.67  The additional resources were necessary, in part, because Hamidi took steps to 
defeat Intel’s security, forcing the company to bolster that security by blocking and removing the 
messages.68
{19}  The California appellate court began its discussion of the nature of trespass to chattels and 
the Internet by noting “[t]he common law adapts to human endeavor.”69  The court recognized 
the additional challenge of applying the law to the electronic world of communication in that 
“[t]respass to chattels is somewhat arcane and suffers from desuetude.”70  Not dissuaded, the 
court then proceeded to chart the development of the common law of trespass to chattels and 
its historical precedents.71  It noted the progression of cases from early in the common law, and 
arrived at the conclusion that trespass to chattels could occur with electronic messages, as they 
are close enough to tangible personal property to fall into the chattel category.72  In addition, the 
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damage to the chattel was found in the time that the system administrators of Intel took to block 
the messages, and the time of each employee who opened, read and disposed of the individual 
message found in their e-mail.  Thus, the court upheld an injunction ordering Hamidi to cease 
sending e-mails to Intel employees’ business addresses.73
 {20}  In June 2003, the Supreme Court of California reversed judgment of the appellate court, 
distinguishing both the facts and the law from the earlier decision.74  Noting most of the facts 
cited by the summary judgment, the sending of critical emails to Intel employees by Hamidi 
and the subsequent blocking and cease and desist notices by Intel, the court reached different 
conclusions about these actions.75  Whereas in the earlier decision the court described Hamidi’s 
actions as a breach of Intel’s security system, the Supreme Court of California noted that no 
evidence supported this allegation.76  Instead, internal Intel e-mails referred to the fact that no 
security was breached, and Hamidi stated that he obtained the e-mail list from a computer disc 
that was sent to him anonymously.77  
 {21}  Next, the Supreme Court discussed and adopted the Restatement definition of trespass to 
torts as the law of California. 78  The court noted the position of Prosser & Keeton and found that 
while there has been some disagreement, there must be actual damage to the personal property, 
not merely nominal damages.79  The court stated that “[t]he dispositive issue in this case, 
therefore, is whether the undisputed facts demonstrate Hamidi’s actions caused or threatened 
to cause damage to Intel’s computer system, or injury to its rights in that personal property, such 
as to entitle Intel to judgment as a matter of law.”80  Reviewing past cases, the court found that 
in order to constitute damage to a computer system there must be an “actual or threatened 
interference with the computers’ functioning.”81  The court considered the application of the 
tort of trespass to chattels in cases of automated search engines and spam and found that the 
damages required an impairment of the system, as with the sending of millions of spam e-mails 
and automated searches, or the threatened impairment of the system.82
 {22}  Significantly, the court carefully described and distinguished the case from eBay v. Bidders 
Edge.83 To the extent that the eBay court based its decision on the threatened harm that many 
automated searches could inflict upon the computer system if allowed access without limit, the 
court agreed with the finding that trespass occurred because of the threatened impairment.84 
The court expressly disagreed with any application of the principle that harm could result from 
minor intrusions, and declined to accept the eBay decision taken out of that specific context.85 
Furthermore, the court noted its skepticism about accepting the CompuServe line of cases that 
categorized the loss of goodwill and more generalized economic injury as sufficient for trespass 
to chattels.86  Even if it were to accept this approach, however, the Intel injury would still be 
too attenuated to suffice as a recognizable harm.  CompuServe lost customers as a result of 
the impact that spam had on the functioning of the system, while Intel’s loss was only for the 
“distraction” that the e-mails caused to its employees, unrelated to the system function.87  Finally, 
the court specifically rejected the Oyster Software decision as an incorrect statement of California 
law to the extent that it held that the mere access to another’s website in order to copy metatags 
was a trespass, without proof of actual damages.88
{23}  Thus, the California Supreme Court returns the tort of trespass to chattels to its common 
law roots.  In order to succeed, a trespass to chattels allegation involving computer systems must 
include actual or threatened damage.  This decision squarely puts the computer system into the 
realm of personal property rather than real property, although arguments that the real property 
analogy should apply were raised by amici.
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C.  Electronic Speech and Real Property
 {24}  The rights of free speech often conflict with the rights of the landowner to control access 
to and use of the property.89 The appellate court in Hamidi was one of the first courts to address 
this issue as it applies to the Internet, and it favored property rights over rights of speech, at least 
within the facts presented.90  However, the dissent in the appellate Hamidi case focused on the 
fact that the damage alleged was too far removed from the property to constitute a trespass.91 
The dissent argued that employee time is not closely connected to the system itself,92 unlike 
previous electronic trespass cases, where the damage caused by robots, for example, was 
identified as the use of and limitation to the electronic system.93  Indeed, in Hamidi, Intel claimed 
no damage from the e-mails clogging their system, and under the facts it is questionable that 
they could have succeeded in that argument.94
{25}  The dissent warned that extending the tort of trespass to chattels to situations where 
the harm consists of merely having to read unwanted e-mails could result in quite significant 
unintended consequences,95 and that it, “transforms a tort meant to protect possessory 
interests into one that merely attacks speech.”96 One commentator criticized the majority’s 
characterization of the e-mails as a physical trespass on private property and suggested that 
Hamidi’s conduct was instead like that of a person shouting at Intel’s employees from a public 
park outside Intel’s offices “and Intel wants the court to force Hamidi to take his megaphone and 
his message elsewhere.”97  Indeed, it is likely that Intel’s primary objection was to the message, 
not to the minimal burden of closing the office windows to reduce the noise.
{26}  The California Supreme Court in Hamidi agreed with the dissent in the lower court, 
specifically reviewing, but rejecting, arguments that the law applied to computer systems should 
mirror the inviolability of real property so that the owner would have complete control over the 
use of that system. 98  Amici curiae briefs were filed on both sides of the case.  On one side, 
amici argued in support of the real property analogy, pointing out that the metaphors used for 
the Internet are real property ones such as those discussed earlier: “information superhighway,” 
“cyberspace,” and “addresses.”99 The court was not persuaded that metaphors should have an 
effect on law and noted that other metaphors lent themselves to concepts of personal property, 
such as the “Net,” which could be analogized to a fisherman’s net.100  The court noted that “such 
fictions promise more confusion than clarity in the law.”101  The second argument, that it would 
be economically beneficial and socially desirable to treat computer systems as real property, was 
also rejected by the court.102
{27}  Amici also argued that companies that are given the right to complete control over their 
computer systems will continue to allow linking and connecting to the Internet, and that in a 
specific case of access denial, individual licensing will most efficiently resolve the dispute.103  
However, other amici argued that the benefit of the Internet itself is that it is an open network. 
Individual restrictions on the operation and use of the open network could impose significant 
transaction costs and decrease its intrinsic value.104  Despite this dilemma, the court declined to 
offer a solution, maintaining instead that legislatures had already separately begun to address 
the problems of spam and that a blanket ruling analogizing computer systems to real property 
would be premature.105
{28}  A related issue is whether the real property analogy should qualify the system as a 
public forum.  Although a recent case held that an internet chat room is not a place of public 
accommodation, no case to date has presented the general question of whether a private web 
site can operate as a public forum.106  This could be the basis of future action if the court applies 
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the physical place analogy.  If a court uses the Albertson case as a guide, it may well classify a 
private web site as a public forum.107  A business web site that is open to the public cannot exist 
as a “stand alone” store.108  Only through its existence within the Internet and interconnectedness 
with all other web sites does it operate.  The interconnected web of the Internet is its essence and 
its commercial value.  In addition, the history of the Internet as a government sponsored medium 
– where the government still maintains an active but indirect role in its management – provides 
an argument for its categorization as a public forum.109  The Supreme Court has noted that the 
Internet is truly a medium for communication.110  Yet how does an internal company network, 
limited to employee use and utilizing the public network known as the Internet, relate to public 
communication?111
{29}  The next section considers another cyberspace context in which the concepts of property 
and place are intertwined with speech.  Do the laws preventing discrimination in places of public 
accommodation apply to Internet chat rooms?  Should the anti-discrimination laws applicable to 
private property govern a virtual forum for communication?
III. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION AND COMMON CARRIAGE
 {30}  The law applied to public accommodations is found in the common law, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.  Like trespass, the law regarding public 
accommodation has a long history in the common law.  This history was recounted in a U.S. 
Supreme Court case challenging the conviction for trespass of twelve African American students 
after a sit-in at a Maryland restaurant in 1963.112  The court stated that “the good old common 
law” required that the state insure all citizens’ access to places of public accommodations.113   
This is the basis of an innkeeper’s duty “to take in all travelers and wayfaring persons,” then 
extended to common carriers, and later to public shows and amusements.114
A. Civil Rights Act
{31}  Access to public accommodation is also guaranteed under federal civil rights laws.  The 
common law duty to provide access to public accommodations is the basis of Title II of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act.  The Act provides: “All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of 
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of 
race, color, religion or national origin.”115
{32}  Since its enactment in 1964, the Civil Rights Act and its state counterparts have been 
interpreted many times as the struggle to end discrimination extended to forums beyond essential 
services, such as education, transportation, and lodging.116  Among the many defenses raised 
by groups and institutions seeking to avoid the mandate of equal treatment, a number of cases 
revolved around the question of whether the site of the discrimination was a “place” at all.    
Defendants who are membership organizations have argued that they are “private clubs” and thus 
exempt from the Act.117  Alternatively, if membership is non-exclusive, organizations have argued 
that their activities are not tied to a particular place and therefore the organization does not come 
within the definition of “place of public accommodation.”118 
{33}  In Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America,119 Mark Welsh, a seven year-old boy who was denied 
admission to the Boy Scouts because of his refusal to take an oath affirming his belief in God, 
argued that that his exclusion from the organization was illegal discrimination based on his 
religious belief.  The Boy Scouts of America asserted that the organization was a membership 
organization and therefore not subject to the Act.  First, the court asked “whether Congress 
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intended to govern organizations like the Boy Scouts within the statutory language ‘place of 
public accommodation’ or ‘other place of . . . entertainment?’”120  The court noted that although 
the statute lists fifteen examples of regulated facilities, none of them “remotely resembles a 
membership organization.”121  The court then considered whether the Boy Scouts of America 
was included as a place of exhibition or entertainment.  And again, the court concluded that 
the language of the statute does not include a “membership organization whose purpose is not 
closely connected to a particular facility.”122
{34}  Title II of the Civil Rights Act does not include a prohibition against gender discrimination in 
places of public accommodation.  Thus, when the National Organization for Women successfully 
challenged the Little League’s exclusion of girls from its activities, it did so under the New 
Jersey state civil rights statute.123 The New Jersey law is broader than the federal law, because it 
extends to gender discrimination, but the public accommodation language is similar to Title II.  In 
interpreting that language, the New Jersey court stated:
The statutory noun “place” (of public accommodation) is a term of convenience, 
not of limitation.  It is employed to reflect the fact that public accommodations are 
commonly provided at “fixed places,” e.g., hotels, restaurants, swimming pools, etc.  
But a public conveyance, like a train, is a “place” of public accommodation although 
it has a moving situs….124
{35}  Likewise, the court dismissed the defense that Little League is a membership organization 
similar to a private club.  The court approved of the lower court’s conclusion that “membership 
organizations, although not having a ‘specific pinpointable geographic area,’ are nevertheless 
places of public accommodation if, as Little League does, they offer advantages and facilities on 
the basis of a general, public invitation to join.”125
B. Americans with Disabilities Act 
{36}  The Americans with Disabilities Act requires that access to public accommodation be 
available to persons with disabilities, providing that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated 
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person 
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”126
{37}  A recent, much debated case interpreting this language in the Americans with Disabilities 
Act is PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin.127  Casey Martin, a well-known and talented professional golfer, 
has a circulatory disorder that prevents him from walking golf courses.128  The use of a golf cart 
violated one of the rules of the Professional Golfers’ Association (PGA), which sponsors major 
golf tournaments for which Martin qualified in all other respects.129  Martin sued, alleging that 
the PGA was a place of public accommodation, and as such, was required to make reasonable 
accommodation to individuals with disabilities.130 The court examined whether the PGA is a place 
of public accommodation, under Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act, and if so, whether 
the use of the golf cart fundamentally alters the nature of the event?131
{38}  The PGA argued that it was a private club or private establishment, or, alternatively, that “the 
play areas of its tour competitions do not constitute places of public accommodation.”132  The 
list of covered establishments under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and those of 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act are similar.  In fact, the first three categories of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act are identical to the categories of the Civil Rights Act, although the language is 
slightly more modern.133
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{39}  The Martin Court noted the similarity of the two statutes.  The Court stated that its 
conclusion that the PGA is a place of public accommodation is consistent with case law under 
the Civil Rights Act, citing Daniel v. Paul,134 a 1969 civil rights case.  In Daniel, the court found 
that a snack bar in a recreational club made the club a place of public accommodation,135 
but the Court in Martin cited Daniel as standing for the proposition that the phrase “place of 
public accommodation” covers participants in a sport or athletic activity, with no reference 
to the snack bar that was the basis of the Daniel court’s decision.136  In essence, the Martin 
court interpreted the Civil Rights Act to apply to a much broader range of activities than those 
occurring at a specific, physical place.137 The court concluded that the PGA was a place of public 
accommodation, but, in fact, the Professional Golfers’ Association is an organization and not a 
place at all.
{40}  Can we conclude that, in using the same language as the Civil Rights Act, Congress, when 
it enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act almost thirty years later, intended that the Acts 
would be interpreted consistently?  That appears to be what the Supreme Court believed in the 
Martin case.  To take the contrary position that the Americans with Disabilities Act contains a 
broader description of place of public accommodation than the Civil Rights Act would mean that 
Congress is more concerned about disability discrimination than it is about racial, religious and 
ethnic discrimination. If the Supreme Court correctly interpreted Congress’ intent, it is certainly 
likely that in the passage of time since 1964, Congress realized that more and more activities are 
important to equal access to society’s benefits and opportunities.
C.  The Internet and Public Accommodation  
{41}  Accommodation law, as described above, requires that places open to the public be non-
discriminatory.  But, is the Internet a place?138  Webster’s Dictionary defines “place” as, among 
other things, a “physical environment” or “an indefinite region or expanse.”139  While the first 
definition describes the traditional notion of place, the second one could describe the concept of 
cyberspace as a place.  
{42}  Cases discussed in the previous sections of this paper indicate that a number of courts have 
viewed computer networks as property with physical characteristics, upon which robots may enter 
and trespass.140  It has been recognized that “at early common law, trespass required a physical 
touching of another’s chattel or entry onto another’s land.  The modern rule recognizes an indirect 
touching or entry.”141 This rule has recognized trespass from dust particles, smoke, sound waves, 
and, most recently, electronic signals.142 Thus, the courts have interpreted the common law tort 
of trespass over time to award damages for harm similar to a physical interference, although the 
property being trespassed on and the trespasser are no longer required to have a physical form.  
Using the development of this trespass model for the question of place, will the law recognize the 
Internet as fitting within Webster’s definition of “an indefinite region or expanse”143 that has no 
physical location as a place?
{43}  This question is posed with respect to online chat rooms in a United States District Court 
case in which the plaintiff claimed that America Online’s unequal treatment of hate messages 
based on religion and national origin in its chat rooms amounted to discrimination in a place 
of public accommodation, prohibited by Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.144  Plaintiff Noah, 
a Muslim male, filed suit on behalf of himself and other Muslims who were current and former 
members of American Online and were “insulted, threatened, mocked, ridiculed and slandered 
by other AOL members due to their religious beliefs in AOL’s ‘Beliefs in Islam’ and ‘Koran’ chat 
rooms.”145 Although AOL’s terms of service state that this type of offensive content is prohibited, 
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and that those who post such messages may have their membership terminated, Noah claimed 
that AOL did not enforce these rules in the chat rooms equally, and that content offensive to 
Muslim beliefs was not addressed.  Furthermore, Noah claimed that AOL enforced the rules in 
chat rooms dealing with other subjects and, particularly, with other faiths.  As a result, Noah 
argued this differential treatment was religious discrimination in violation of the contract 
with AOL in its terms of use, Title II and the First Amendment.146 The court recognized that 
the identified chat room communication directed to Muslims was “offensive, obnoxious, and 
indecent.” 147 Regardless, AOL’s terms of service allowed, rather than required, AOL to take action, 
and therefore the breach of contract claim failed. 148
{44}  The Noah court rejected Noah’s Title II claims for two reasons.  First, it found that section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act149 granted immunity to AOL, an interactive computer 
service provider.150 It found that AOL, as a service provider, cannot be treated as a publisher, and 
cannot be held liable for the statements of third parties made in the chat rooms, according to 
section 230. Noah’s argument that AOL was a place of public accommodation, not a publisher, 
and was therefore without immunity under section 230, was unpersuasive.   In considering Noah’s 
request for an injunction, the court noted that it would treat AOL as a publisher under section 
230.151 And, since the Civil Rights Act was not mentioned in the list of exceptions to section 230 
immunity, the court found that claims such as Noah’s were subject to its provisions.152
{45}  Nevertheless, the court went on to consider the Title II claim, and concluded that “AOL’s 
chat rooms and other online services did not constitute a ‘place of public accommodation’ under 
Title II.”153 The court rejected the reasoning that computer networks share the legal attributes 
of physical places for purposes of coverage under the Civil Rights Act, stating that “[a]lthough 
a chat room may serve as a virtual forum through which AOL members can meet and converse 
in cyberspace, it is not an ‘establishment’ under the plain meaning of that term as defined by 
the statute.”154 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that membership organizations, such 
as the Boy Scouts, were not found to be places of accommodation.155  The court also reviewed 
the Americans with Disabilities Act cases involving the issue of non-physical places as public 
accommodations, noting that jurisdictions are split on this question.
{46}  In Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., the federal district court in Florida refused to 
extend the Americans with Disabilities Act to websites.156  The plaintiff, an advocacy organization 
for the disabled, claimed that Southwest Airlines violated the Americans with Disabilities Act 
because its online ticket purchasing system was inaccessible to blind persons.157  The court noted 
that the Eleventh Circuit had historically taken a narrow view of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act with respect to the definition of place, in contrast to the more inclusive position of other 
circuits.  While these circuit court cases did not involve web sites, they each considered a service 
that was not attached to a physical location, and therefore were considered by the court.158
{47}  In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Association,159 the First 
Circuit held that the Americans with Disabilities Act covers health benefit plans that are not 
affixed to any physical location.160  The court noted that the Americans with Disabilities Act 
includes “travel service” among the list of services considered “public accommodations,” and 
concluded that the Americans with Disabilities Act is not limited to physical structures.161  The 
court further opined that “[i]t would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office to 
purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over 
the telephone or by mail are not.  Congress could not have intended such an absurd result.”162 
It would certainly be consistent to include websites in the court’s characterization of alternate 
means of accessing services.  
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{48}  In Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.,163 the question was whether the Americans with 
Disabilities Act specifically included insurance polices.164  Judge Posner wrote:
[T]he Core meaning of [42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)], plainly enough, is that the owner or 
operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist’s office, travel agency, theater, Web 
site or other facility (whether in physical space or electronic space) . . . that is open 
to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and, once 
in, from using the facility in the same way that the nondisabled do.165
{49}  In Access Now, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida was not persuaded by 
the Doe and Carparts cases. The court stated that if it followed Doe, it would be compelled to 
find in favor of the Internet being a place of public accommodation, but that to hold in this way 
would conflict with the narrower view taken by the Eleventh Circuit.166  In a previous Eleventh 
Circuit case, the plaintiff challenged the Who Wants to be a Millionaire television show’s method 
of screening contestants over the telephone, as discriminating against the disabled.167 The court 
held that if the discrimination does not actually occur at a physical place, in order to be actionable 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, there must be a nexus between the discrimination and 
a physical location.168  It found such a nexus in the case, because the screening process was the 
method to choose contestants who would appear at the physical site of the show.169  Applying 
this narrow rationale, the district court in Access Now found that the website was not covered by 
the Americans with Disabilities Act because it was not a means of accessing an actual physical 
location.170  The court noted that although such a nexus might be found between the virtual ticket 
counter and the aircraft, aircraft were specifically exempted from the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.171  One may speculate that the circuit courts that heard the Carparts and Mutual of Omaha 
cases might disagree if similar facts were presented. 
{50}  Relying heavily on the Access Now decision, the Noah court did not address the fact that the 
harm allegedly suffered by Saad Noah was exactly the kind of harm that Congress intended to 
redress in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.172  Support for taking this harm into account 
is found in prior Supreme Court decisions. In finding that the Act covered a recreational area with 
a snack bar in Daniel v. Paul,173 the Supreme Court stated: 
Admittedly, most of the discussion in Congress regarding the coverage of Title II 
focused on places of spectator entertainment rather than recreational areas.  But 
it does not follow that the scope . . . should be restricted to the primary objects of 
Congress’ concern when a natural reading of its language would call for broader 
coverage.17 
{51}  As the foregoing discussion suggests, a reading of the language is ambiguous with regard 
to the law’s application to cyberspace.  Consequently, unless Congress moves to amend the law, 
it may be left to the states to address online discrimination in the online forum.  Lastly, the Noah 
court quickly dispensed with the First Amendment claim, because there was no state action 
involved in the private actions of AOL concerning its chat rooms.175
IV. A NEW FRAMEWORK
{52}  In the 1999 Department of Commerce report, Falling Through the Net: Defining the Digital 
Divide,176 the National Telecommunications and Information Administration observed that access 
to the Internet was a prerequisite to full participation in the society of the twenty-first century.177  
In this early report, participation was equated with access:
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For some individuals, it is an economic solution. Lower prices, leasing 
arrangements, and even free computer deals will bridge the digital gap for them. 
For high cost communities and low-income individuals, universal service policies 
will remain of critical importance. For other individuals, there are language and 
cultural barriers that need to be addressed. Products will need to be adapted 
to meet special needs, such as those of the disabled community. Finally, we 
need to redouble our outreach efforts, especially directed at the information 
disadvantaged.178
{53}  In its most recent report, the Department of Commerce found that Internet access 
was growing rapidly,179 leading one commentator to conclude that the digital divide is not 
the civil liberties issue of the twenty-first century.180  However, while access remains an 
important first step, it alone will not create equality of opportunity to participate in the 
electronic revolution.181 As demonstrated by the civil rights struggles of the past century, 
just opening the door to the schoolhouse is not sufficient for equality of treatment.  The 
curriculum, the teachers, and the textbooks must not exclude anyone from meaningful 
participation.  Similarly, the way in which the Internet is managed and how speech is 
allowed to be privately regulated will determine if certain groups are able to fully use and 
enjoy their access.
{54}  Entertainment, work, banking and investing, shopping, and social interaction are just some 
of the functions that occurred in physical space in 1964 when the Civil Rights Act was passed to 
prohibit discrimination in these spaces.  All of these lifetime activities, and more, now also occur 
in cyberspace.  The stated purpose of the Civil Rights Act, however, is significantly undermined if 
the activities in cyberspace are exempt from its coverage.  While economic barriers to Internet 
access appear to be diminishing, barriers based on discrimination have, heretofore, received little 
attention.  Noah requires the court to consider whether the legal tools exist to insure that such 
barriers will not be built in cyberspace.182  The court in Access Now chose not to open the doors of 
the Internet to all citizens.183  This presents a crossroads online; if access is to be guaranteed, it 
must be guaranteed through legislation. 
{55}  Any proposed legislation must take into account the various types of Internet activity. 
Participatory Internet activities, like their physical world counterparts, vary widely.  For example, 
people may join a listserv in order to carry on a conversation with like-minded people, people 
in the same occupation, or with some other common characteristic.  A listserv is analogous to 
a private club, if membership is based on a legitimate credential related to the purpose of the 
list.  A listserv that admits members who only share a commitment to a particular purpose would 
likely be an exempt membership organization under the Civil Rights Act, if the Civil Rights Act is 
applied to the Internet.  
{56}  A chat room, on the other hand, is open to anyone who joins the network.  AOL membership 
is solicited through general advertisement, distribution of the software through the mail, 
and automatic membership with the purchase of a new personal computer from certain 
manufacturers.  It is “open to the public” in every sense of the word.  People meet, and have 
real-time conversations in these virtual rooms, just as they would in physical rooms.  The advent 
of streaming audio and video capability increasingly blurs the distinction between physical and 
cyber locations.  Thus, the provider should not create discriminatory barriers by setting different 
standards for participation based on characteristics that are prohibited by civil rights legislation.
{57}  Any proposal to relieve the tension between the legal treatment of the Internet as place 
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or property, or a medium of expression, should balance the interests of those who maintain the 
online forum and those who seek access to it.  Rather than attempting to meld the analysis of 
the Internet medium into common law and existing statutes that are ill equipped to address the 
technological issues, it is proposed that a new framework be adopted.  A new framework will 
result in a cleaner approach that does not blur the distinction between trespass to chattels and 
trespass to realty, and which will recognize the incredible public interest in preserving speech in 
this “most participatory form of mass speech yet developed.”184 The metaphors used to describe 
the Internet, at their worst, serve to blur the nature of the medium.  In truth, the Internet is a 
place where people meet to communicate, where businesses meet consumers and sell their 
products, and where investments in web site development and presence are electronic versions 
of property.  No one metaphor, or legal parallel, will reflect the myriad nature of this Internet. 
Therefore, new terminology, which recognizes the complexity of the Internet relationship, 
is necessary.  While abandoning outdated laws and imprecise language, it is unnecessary 
to abandon the principles upon which our historical legal concepts depend.  The proposed 
framework creates new terminology for addressing the Internet, yet incorporates the recognized 
principles that public policy demands: private property, public access and free speech.  Only new 
terminology can bring legal clarity to apply these principles to the Internet medium. 
{58}  One approach to resolving the tension between the Internet as a voice and the Internet 
as a place looks, in part, to the common law of public accommodation as the basis for a new 
Restatement concept.  The authors propose the following new Restatement provisions:
Places of Public Communication
A private provider of online content and/or access creates a place of public communication 
when: 
1)   the online access or content is generally available to the public; or 
2)   the online access or content is available to a limited number of persons for a 
commercial reason.
3)  A place of public communication does not include any content or access made 
available by a person for employee- or independent contractor-only use. 
Access to Places of Public Communication
1) A place of public communication shall not discriminate based on age, disability, 
gender, national origin, political views, race, or religion.
2) Individuals who are harmed by discrimination in a place of public communication 
shall have an action in tort to recover actual damages, attorney’s fees and costs. 
Rights Associated with Places of Public Communication
1) Reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions on public access may be imposed 
on places of public communication in order to prevent interference with normal 
business operations. 
2) Persons who enter places of public communication shall have the duty to abide by 
reasonable and non-discriminatory restrictions established by the provider. 
3) Failure to follow reasonable and non-discriminatory restrictions creates tort liability 
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for the actual, non-trivial harm incurred by the provider of the place of public 
communication. 
4) These rights replace the rights of the provider of the place of public communication 
to pursue actions in trespass. 
{59}  Thus, a place of public communication seeks to extend the common law duty of non-
discrimination imposed on innkeepers and common carriers to online service providers.  The 
provision seeks to protect the private property of the provider, while at the same time it 
recognizes the special duty to the public that a person or corporation has when the means 
of public communication are within that entity’s control.  The analysis of the cases described 
in this article under the proposed Restatement provisions would necessarily begin with an 
inquiry as to whether the Internet use in each case meets the definition of a place of public 
communication.  Only if that preliminary test were met would the provider be required to open 
access to the public and face liability for discriminatory practices in that identified cyberplace.  
{60}  The AOL chat rooms in the Noah case clearly fall within the new definition, and Noah 
would have a claim in tort for damages.  The Intel e-mail system in the Hamidi case would also 
fall within the definition because, although it is a local area network for employees, it is also 
connected to the Internet and messages can travel freely into and out of the local e-mail system.  
The critical issue in assessing Intel’s liability under this new framework would be determining 
whether it had reasonable restrictions on public access and whether Hamidi violated those 
restrictions.  
{61}  The implication of establishing the concept of a place of public communication is resonant 
of the private property/public forum debate that emerged as privately-owned shopping centers 
and malls began to replace publicly-owned streets and parks in downtown areas.185  In a series 
of cases, the Supreme Court first recognized rights of speech in a company town,186 then in a 
shopping center,187 whose recent development had replaced the downtown as a center of public 
activity.188 The Supreme Court later overturned these rulings under federal law, but affirmed the 
rights of states to protect public speech on private property for the public good.189 The debate 
re-emerges as the Internet begins to replace other forums for speech.  The proposed framework 
utilizes state law, rather than federal law, to implement regulation, and is therefore consistent 
with precedent.  Internet sites are open to vast numbers of people; therefore, the emphasis in 
Pruneyard that the regulations do not apply to small businesses or individuals190 is easily met 
when applied to the online place of public communication. 
{62}  The requirement of reasonable terms of use recognizes that there should be a limit, for 
public policy reasons of openness and preservation of mass speech forums, to the terms that 
a private website owner may impose on the public. This right was referred to in EF Cultural 
TravelBV v. Zefer Corporation,191 a case brought under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.192  
While the court recognized that terms of use could prevent the use of automated robots, similar 
to those used in eBay v. Bidder’s Edge,193 it also stated in dictum that terms of use that sought 
to completely deny website access to competitors, to otherwise publicly available website 
information, would raise serious policy concerns.194 The reasonableness standard included in 
the framework recognizes the importance of the public policy of openness.  It is also supported 
by the Supreme Court’s statement that neither property nor contract rights are absolute, and 
may be narrowly regulated by the state.195 It is particularly appropriate for the state to regulate 
places of public communication, because much of the value of website property comes from the 
interconnectedness of the network.  While property, in general, is dependent on legal recognition 
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to define its parameters, no other type of property is as dependent upon the existence of, and 
connection with, other property as is web site property.  While in the world of physical property 
it is the right to the exclusive use of property, and the corollary right to exclude all others, which 
gives value to the property, in the online world it is the ability of others to access, use, and 
communicate with the computer which gives value to the network.
{63}  The place of public communication model adopts some of the trespass to chattels rationale, 
where interference with the network was the proven harm to the plaintiffs.196 However, it would 
prevent further extension of the trespass doctrine as a means for service providers to suppress 
certain forms of speech where the damage is the unwanted speech itself, not interference with 
the operation of the website.  That is, if the harm is trivial, it is similar to “pulling the ears of a 
dog,”197 and may be non-compensable.  
{64}  On the other hand, the framework clearly protects rights of public speech when occurring in 
a place of public communication.  An AOL chat room would fall within the definition of a place of 
public communication, and therefore, for example, if the allegations in Noah were proven to have 
been true, liability would have resulted under this provision.  
V. CONCLUSION 
{65}  The proposed framework for places of public communication balances online property 
rights with online access and speech rights, and recognizes the unique quality of the Internet 
by protecting both voice and property.  It seeks to preserve the rights historically associated 
with private property, while at the same time recognizing that when an online private property 
owner transforms that property into a place for public communication, receiving a benefit from 
that transformation, then the property owner can be subject to the common law duty of non-
discrimination traditionally imposed on innkeepers and common carriers.
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